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Extending the Bounds of Rationality:
Evidence and Theories of
Preferential Choice

JORG RIESKAMP, JEROME R. BUSEMEYER, AND BARBARA A. MELLERS*

Most economists define rationality in terms of consistency principles. These principles

place "bounds" on rationality-bounds that range from perfect consistency to weak
stochastic transitivity. Several decades of research on preferential choice has demonstrated how and when people violate these bounds. Many of these violations are inter-

connected and reflect systematic behavioral principles. We discuss the robustness of
the violations and review the theories that are able to predict them. We further discuss

the adaptive functions of the violations. From this perspective, choices do more than
reveal preferences; they also reflect subtle, yet often quite reasonable, dependencies on
the environment.
1. Introduction

preference for chocolate over vanilla ice

Preferences are inherently subjective and

cream is "rational" without knowing the atti-

tudes, values, perceptions, beliefs, and goals

arise from a mixture of aspirations, of that individual. For this reason, most the-

thoughts, motives, emotions, beliefs, and
orists evaluate the rationality of behavior
desires. This inherent subjectivity means
using principles of consistency and coher-

that preferences are not easily evaluated

ence within a system of preferences and

against objective criteria without knowledge beliefs.
of an individual's goals. For example, it is
The view that rationality only refers to
impossible to know whether an individual's
internal coherence and logical consistency
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has been sharply criticized on multiple
grounds. Many have argued (e.g., Gerd
Gigerenzer 1996a) that consistency principles are insufficient for defining rationality.

If the achievement of an individual's goal
does not imply consistency, it is questionable
whether functional behavior that violates

consistency principles should be called "irra-

tional." In addition, people are imperfect

0111944 awarded to the University of California, information processors and limited in both

knowledge and computational capacity.

Berkeley.
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Figure 1. Five Consistency Principles and Their Relatedness

Herbert A. Simon (1956, 1983) and others
(Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten 2001) use
the term bounded rationality to describe
human behavior. Consistency violations
might well be adaptive when time, knowl-

principles that go beyond assumptions about
the properties or attributes of the choice

edge, or resources are scarce (e.g., Robert J.

free commodity bundles.

Aumann 1962; Mark J. Machina 1982;

Michele Cohen and Jean-Yves Jaffray 1988;

Gigerenzer 1991, 1996b; Lola L. Lopes and

Gregg C. Oden 1991; Kenneth R.

Hammond 1996; Lopes 1996; Philippe
Mongin 2000).
Several decades of research on preferential

objects. For example, the transitivity axiom is

applicable to a wide range of choice objects,
including both risky gambles as well as risk

We organize our paper around five consistency principles that are summarized in
figure 1. Each principle helps to define a
class of theories. The principles differ in
type (logically independent principles-one

principle does not imply anything about
another), and strength (logically dependent

choice has led to an impressive body of principles-a stronger principle implies a
weaker one). The principles have been

empirical knowledge on how and when people violate consistency principles of preferen-

labeled from I to V, but they only allow a

tial choice. The purpose of this article is to

partial ordering of constraints.

review these basic facts. Our review differs

The first principle is perfect consistency

from previous reviews (e.g., Paul J. H. or invariant preferences across occasions.
Schoemaker 1982; Chris Starmer 2000) in Perfect consistency implies the other four
terms of the consistency principles we exam-

ine. Previous reviews focused primarily on

principles. The second principle, strong stochastic transitivity, is logically equivalent to

consistency across operations applied to the third principle, independence from irrelevant alternatives (Amos Tversky and
properties of choice objects. For example, the
Edward J. Russo 1969). Regularity is the
independence axiom of expected utility theofourth principle, but there is no logical connection between independence from irrelevant alternatives and regularity (one does
contrast, we are interested in consistencynot logically imply the other). Independence

ry requires consistency across linear transformations of probabilities and thus is restricted
to the domain of decisions under risk. In
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from irrelevant alternatives implies the fifth
principle of weak stochastic transitivity.
A primary goal of this paper is to assess the

degree to which preferential choices obey
the principles. For each principle, we summarize the empirical evidence. When are the
violations serious and robust? When are they
small or limited? By evaluating the types of
violations and the magnitude of those violations, we can determine which principles
must be relaxed in descriptive theories of
preferential choice. Furthermore, we show
that many violations are related and suggest
some underlying behavioral regularities that
should be addressed in a general descriptive
theory.

A secondary goal is to discuss theories of
preferential choice in terms of the consistency principles. We will review classes of theo-

ries and discuss their compliance or lack of
compliance with the five consistency principles. When evaluating the different theories,
we will consider the extent to which they can
describe empirical violations of the consistency principles. We will also consider the complexity of the theories. Selten (1991) argued
that, if two models are equally successful in
predicting existing data, the parsimonious
model that, in principle, is only able to predict a small range of data should be preferred
over the more complex model that, a priori,
can predict a larger range of data. In a similar
vein, Mark Pitt, In Jae Myung, and Shaobo
Zhang (2002) have argued that a model's generalizability, or the ability of the model to pre-

dict independent new data, is essential to
model selection. A complex model might be
superior to a simpler model when fitting
observed behavior, but, due to the danger of
overfitting, the complex model might be predicting noise rather than systematic regulari-

ties and, therefore, is less suitable for

predicting new independent behavior.
A third goal of this paper is to step back and

reconsider the meaning of rationality. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each

principle from different perspectives and
address the question of how far the bounds of

rationality must be pushed to accommodate
basic and systematic regularities in human

choice.

2. Perfect Consistency
The standard utility theory of preference
begins by positing a choice set, X = {A, B,
C, ... }, with elements, A, B, and C, denoting

the options. The choice might involve

meals, movies, or mutual funds. A preference relation, >W is defined for all pairs of
options, such that A >_pB means that option
A is preferred to option B, or that the decisionmaker is indifferent. Finally, a set of
axioms is imposed on the preference relations to permit the construction of a utility
function u: X --+ R. The utility function
assigns a real-valued utility to each option
(e.g., u(A) is the utility assigned to option
A), and the order implied by the utilities is

used to predict the empirical preference
ordering, that is, u(A) > u(B) if, and only if

A p B.
Standard utility theories include the
expected utility theory (John von Neumann

and Oskar Morgenstern 1947), rankdependent utility theories (e.g., John

Quiggin 1982; Chew Soo Hong, Edi Karni,
and Zvi Safra 1987; Menahem E. Yaari 1987;
Jerry R. Green and Bruno Jullien 1989; R.
Duncan Luce 1990), and multiattribute utility theories (Ralph L. Keeney and Howard

Raiffa 1976; Detlof von Winterfeldt and

Ward Edwards 1986). All such theories are

based on the axiom of transitivity.

Transitivity states that for any triad of
options, A, B, and C, if two preferences hold,

A >p B and B 0, C, then a third one should
follow, A p C. This axiom is a cornerstone of
normative and descriptive theories because
it implies that the utilities can be represent-

ed as transitive, real numbers (Paul
Samuelson 1953; Edwards 1954, 1961).
To test this axiom, one must measure pref-

erences. There are at least two commonly

used methods to "elicit" preferences-one

based on choices and the other based on
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Judged prices, typically referred to as cer-

participants typically change their minds in

tainty equivalents. Unfortunately, these

approximately 25 percent of choice pairs
(approximately equal in expected value but
differing in risk) that are presented twice
(Colin F. Camerer 1989; John D. Hey and
Chris Orme 1994; Peter Wakker, Ido Erev,

methods do not always agree. For example,
when presented with a choice between two
gambles, A and B, individuals may prefer
gamble A on the basis of choice, but state a
higher price for gamble B (for reviews, see

and Elke U. Weber 1994; T. Parker Ballinger

1979; Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein

and Nathaniel T. Wilcox 1997; Jerome R.
Busemeyer, Ethan Weg, Rachel Barkan,

David M. Grether and Charles R. Plott

1983; Tversky, Slovic, and Daniel Kahneman Xuyang Li, and Zhengping Ma 2000).
1990; Barbara A. Mellers, Shi-Jie Chang,
In an extensive study of choice consistenMichael H. Birnbaum, and Lisa D. Ordonez cy, Hey (2001) asked participants to make
1992). The psychological reasons for differ- one hundred choices between pairs of gam-

ent preferences obtained with different bles that were repeated in five sessions.

response modes are controversial, and there Participants were paid according to the outis no real consensus about which method is
come of the chosen gamble. Overall rates of
better. Both methods of eliciting preferences inconsistencies varied greatly across partici-

have pros and cons. Nonetheless, many pants, ranging from 1 percent to 21 percent.

researchers prefer to use choices, and for On average, participants changed their
this reason, we focus on choice1 (for an alter- choices 11 percent of the time from the first

native perspective, see Luce, Mellers, andto the second session. Not a single particiChang 1993).
pant had consistent preferences across the
first two sessions, while rates of inconsistenDifferences in measured preferences
occur not only across methods but also
cy decreased slightly. Participants reversed
across occasions within an individual. In a

their choices 9 percent of the time from the

fourth to the fifth session.2 Virtually all of the
classic study, Frederick Mosteller and Philip
participants were inconsistent throughout
Nogee (1951) demonstrated that individuals
the entire experiment. Only one of the fiftywere often inconsistent in their preferences
for simple gambles over repeated occasions.
three participants made identical choices in
the last three sessions.
Participants were asked to accept or reject
binary gambles with fixed-outcome proba-In sum, we have crossed the first bound of
rationality. The literature is replete with
bilities and increasing amounts to win. The
choice
variability over time, contexts, and
tendency for an individual to select the gamoccasions.
To accommodate these results
ble did not suddenly jump from zero to one
at an acceptable winning payoff. Instead,
and those of many other studies, we must
the assumption that choices are deteracceptance frequencies were a smooth relax
Sshaped function when plotted against theministic, and accept the inherent variability
of preferences.
winning amount. The preference function

was strikingly similar to a psychometric function, such as those derived from the discrim-

3. Strong Stochastic Transitivity

ination of stimuli along psychophysicalWe now turn to probabilistic theories of

continuua, such as loudness, heaviness, and
choice (for an overview, see Anthony A. J.
brightness. More recent evidence shows that

2 Note, however, that in Hey (2001) participants were
1 It is reasonable to assume that when a decisionmaker
forced to select one gamble out of the pairs instead of also
states his or her price or certainty equivalent for an option,
allowing expressions of indifference. Thereby, inconsistent
choices do not necessarily represent systematic or unsyshe or she will often cognitively perform a series of comtematic inconsistencies, but could be due to indifferences
parisons between the option and candidate prices,
although these comparisons are not indispensable.

between particular gambles.
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Marley 1992). These theories posit the exis-

Philipp E. Otto 2006). However, this

tence of a function that maps choice pairs into

approach has not addressed the phenomena

probabilities. Hereafter, p(AI{A,B}) denotes
the probability of choosing A from the set A
and B. Choice probabilities are often estimat-

reviewed in this article.

Random utility theories, representing the
first class of strong probabilistic choice theo-

ed by presenting an individual with the same

ries, are defined as follows: Given a set of n

choice on multiple occasions (with other

options, each option, Ai, is assigned a random utility U(Ai), defined by a single joint
distribution function for all choice sets.3

problems interwoven between repetitions).
Weak probabilistic choice theories imply that

either A is preferred to B if, and only if,
p(AI{A,B}) > .50, or B is preferred to A if, and

Option Ai is always chosen when it has the
highest utility of the available options, and

only if, p(BI{A,B}) > .50 (indifference holds in

its choice probability is:

the very rare case that p(AI{A,B}) = .50; for a
review, see Luce 2000). Strong probabilistic

(1) p(A) = p2[U(A,) > U(Aj),

choice theories make precise predictions

for allj = 1, 2,)...,n,j # i.

about the probability mass of each option in

A simplifying assumption commonly used in
conjunction with standard random utility
models is that the utility of an option can be
expressed as

the set.

There are two classes of strong probabilis-

tic theories-random utility theories and
fixed utility theories (see Gordon Becker,
Morris H. Degroot, and Jacob Marschak

1963; Luce and Patrick Suppes 1965).

According to random utility theories, individuals select the option with the highest

(2) U(Ai) = Ikk ' Xik+ i,
where x are the k attributes of the options, /

utility using a deterministic decision rule and
variable utilities that differ over time and

contexts (Louis L. Thurstone 1959; Becker,

Degroot, and Marschak 1963; Tom

are the weights assigned to the attributes,
and e is an error. Random utility models tend

to differ according to the assumptions made

about the errors. If it is assumed that the

error component is identically and independently distributed following an extreme value

Domencich and Daniel L. McFadden 1975;
distribution, the multinomial logit model
Charles F. Manski 1977; McFadden 1981, results, which is the most common random

2001; Marley and Hans Colonius 1992; for autility choice model (Kenneth E. Train 2003,
review, see Marley 1992). In contrast, fixed for an overview see McFadden 2001).
utility theories (also called "simple scalabili-According to this model, the probability that
ty theories") assume that individuals select
option Ai is chosen is defined as:
the option with the highest utility using a
probabilistic decision rule and deterministic
utilities. If a theory fulfills the property of
simple scalability, each option in a choice set
can be assigned a scale value such that the
choice probabilities are a monotone function 3 More formally, assume that X is a complete set
options and Y is a subset of X(Y CX), that is Y= {A,,...,A,,
of the scale values of the options (Tverskyand X= {A...An} with n 0 m. Define Ux= [U],U2....U,
1972a). A third approach assumes that both as a random utility vector with the probability distributi

(3) xfk)

the utilities and the decision process arefunction

F(u,....u,) = F(u) and density f(u,...,Un) =f(

Then p(AIY) equals the probability of sampling a rand
vector Ux within the set Ai,= {lu e R" I ui, - u
Machinaj= 1 ...m}. This probability equals the integral of the d

deterministic, but choices are based on ran-utility
domly selected strategies (see, e.g.,

1985; John W. Payne, James R. Bettman, and

tribution within the region A,:

Eric J. Johnson 1993; Graham Loomes and

Robert Sugden 1995; J6rg Rieskamp and

p(AIY) = dF(u) = ff(u)du.
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where x and 0 are defined in equation 2. The

u(A) 0 u(B) and the assumption that F is an

key assumption of the model is the independent error component, which implies that the

increasing function of the first argument. The

alternatives' utilities are also independent.

Fixed utility theories, representing the
second class of strong probabilistic choice

class of fixed utility theories includes Luce's
(1959) choice model and many more recent
theories. Although not all random utility the-

ories do, Thurstone's (1927) Case V model

theories, are probabilistic extensions of

and the multinominal logit model described

deterministic utility theories that share a

above also imply strong stochastic transitivity

property known as "simple scalability"

(for proofs, see Luce and Suppes 1965). For a
review, see Hey and Orme (1994) and David
W Harless and Camerer (1994).

(Becker, Degroot, and Marschak 1963; Luce
and Suppes 1965; Tversky 1972a). Fixed utility theories imply that a single scale value can

Does human choice behavior obey the

be assigned to each option in a complete set
of options and that this value will be inde-

principle of strong stochastic transitivity? An

pendent of the other options in the choice set

otherwise. Many of the original experiments
were carried out several decades ago (Clyde

presented. For example, u(A) and u(B) can

overwhelming number of studies suggest

be real numbers that represent the utilities of

H. Coombs 1958; Coombs and Dean G.

options A and B. The choice probability for

Pruitt 1961; David H. Krantz 1967; Tversky

an arbitrary pair of options is determined by
means of a function, F, ranging from zero to

and Russo 1969; Lennart Sjoberg 1975,
1977; Sjoberg and Dora Capozza 1975). In

(4) p(AI{A,B}) = F[u(A),u(B)].

one study (Coombs and Pruitt 1961), participants were asked to choose between monetary gambles with different variances. In 25
percent of all possible triplets, choices vio-

one, where:

F is strictly increasing in the first argument

and strictly decreasing in the second, and

lated strong stochastic transitivity. In anoth-

simplefixed utility theories imply strong stochastic transitivity, which is a natural extension of the deterministic axiom of transitivity

cigarettes as outcomes that were given to the

F[u(A), u(B)] = .50 when u(A) = u(B). All

(see Edwards 1961).
The consistency principle of strong sto-

chastic transitivity states that for any arbitrary

triplet of options, A, B, and C:

If p(AI{A,B}) 0 .50 and p(BI{B,C}) > .50,
then p(A|{A,C}) 0 max{p(AI{A,B}),

p(Bi{B,C})}.

The first condition, p(AI{A,B}) 0 .50,

implies that u(A) 0 u(B). The second con-

dition, p(BI{B,C})>.50, implies that

u(B) 0 u(C). By the transitivity of real

er study of choices between gambles with

participants, Betty J. Griswold and Luce
(1962) found strong stochastic transitivity

violations in 26 percent of all triplets.

Donald L. Rumelhart and James G. Greeno
(1971) presented participants with pairs of

celebrities and asked them to select the

celebrity with whom they would prefer to
have a one-hour conversation. Violations of
strong stochastic transitivity appeared in 46
percent of the possible triplets.

Mellers and Karen Biagini (1994)

reviewed the literature on strong stochastic
transitivity violations and argued that the

presence or absence of such violations

depends on the comparability of options
numbers, u(A) 0 u(C), the first conse(Krantz 1967; Tversky and Russo 1969).
When
people compare multiattribute
quence, p(Al{A,C}) 0 p(Al{A,B}1), follows
from u(B) 0 u(C) and the assumption that options, the similarity of values along one
F is a decreasing function of the second attribute enhances differences on other

argument. The second consequence,
p(AI{A,C})> p(BJ{B,C}), follows from

attributes. These comparability effects are
easily linked to cognitive processing. When
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evaluating options, people pay more attention to attributes that differ. Consider, for
example, two jobs with comparable salaries,
but different commuting times. Due to the
similarity of salaries, people place greater
attention and importance on differences in
commuting times.
Comparability effects imply that violations of strong stochastic transitivity should

follow a specific predictable pattern. Mellers

and Biagini (1994) reanalyzed several data
sets and found strong experimental evi-

Consider a choice between two gambles,
where gamble A has some probability, pA, of
winning xA, and gamble B has some probability, PB, of winning xB. The probability of selecting gamble A over B is the difference between

the products of utilities and subjective
probabilities as follows:

(5) p(AI{A,B}) =
J[U(XA)aS(pA),l-U(XB)aS(pB)'],

where ] is a response function (e.g., a

dence. To illustrate the effect, consider the

cumulative logistic function), and a and P

three gambles shown in table 1. Gamble A
offers a 29 percent chance of winning $3,
chance of winning $17.50, otherwise $0, and
gamble C has a 9 percent chance of winning
$9.70, otherwise $0. Gambles are matched

are weights associated with utilities and
subjective probabilities, respectively. The
weight associated with the utilities, a,
depends on the difference between the
subjective probabilities (i.e., S(pA) - s(pB)).
The bigger the probability difference, the

in expected values. Furthermore, gambles B

smaller the value of a. The same logic holds

and C have relatively similar levels of proba-

for P; the bigger the difference between

Mellers, Chang, Birnbaum, and Ordonez
(1992) found that A was preferred to B,

attached to probabilities. Similar values on

otherwise $0, gamble B has a 5 percent

bility (i.e., 5 percent and 9 percent).

the utilities, the smaller the weight

one attribute enhance differences on other

p(A|{A,B}) = .59, and B was preferred to C,
p(B|{B,C}) = .72. Strong stochastic transitivity implies that the preference for A over C

attributes.

should be at least as high as .72. Instead,

ical model that can explain violations of

p(AI{A,C}), the preference for A over C was
only .51. This finding was observed with and

strong stochastic transitivity by assuming that

without financial incentives (i.e., paying par-

ticipants the gambles' outcomes). One could
argue that either the preference for B over
C was "too strong" or the preference for A
over C was "too weak." Mellers and Biagini
argued that the similarity of probability lev-

els for gambles B and C (5 percent and 9
percent, respectively) increased the perceived differences in payoffs ($17.50 and
$9.70, respectively) making B seem much

better than C.4

Mellers and Biagini (1994) proposed a
contrast-weighting model to explain this pattern of strong stochastic transitivity violations.

4 In their paper, Mellers et al. (1992) presented
strength of preference judgments, which were converted
to choice proportions for this review.

The stochastic difference model (Claudia
Gonzalez-Vallejo 2002) is another psycholog-

options are compared intradimensionally.
For each dimension, the model determines
the proportional advantage or disadvantage
of an option compared with the other option.

For example, if gamble A's outcome is larger
than gamble B's outcome (i.e., XA > XB), the
proportional advantage of gamble A is computed as (xA - XB)/XA. If the winning probabil-

ity of gamble A is smaller than the winning
probability of B, this represents a propor-

tional disadvantage defined as (PB - PA)/PB.

The disadvantage is subtracted from the

advantage providing a proportional difference d. The decisionmaker prefers the first
option, when d is larger than (6+ e), where 6
is a personal decision threshold parameter
and E is a normal distributed error with mean

zero and a standard deviation, o-, as a free
parameter.
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TABLE 1

GAMBLES USED BY MELLERS ET AL. (1992) TO ILLUSTRATE COMPARABILITY EFFECTS
A

B

C

Probability of Winning .29 .05 .09
Amounts to Win $3.00 $17.50 $9.70

4. Independence from Irrelevant
Alternatives

Another principle implied by fixed utility
theories, is the independence from irrelevant

alternatives (IIA). This principle states that
the relative preference for two options, such

as A and B, should not vary when each is
evaluated with respect to option C or D (see

Roy Radner and Marschak 1954; Tversky

and Russo 1969; Tversky 1972a).5
More formally, this principle states that
for any arbitrary quadruple of options, A, B,
C, or D, the following property must hold:

If p(AI{A,C}) 0 p(BI{B,C}),

then p(AI{A,D}) 0 p(B|{B,D}).

The condition on the left implies that
u(A) 0 u(B), and that this order implies the
consequence on the right. There is an equivalence relation between strong stochastic
transitivity and the IIA. Tversky and Russo
(1969) proved that one principle is satisfied

(6) p(Aj{A,B}) = p(AIS)
where S is any possible subset of T including

A and B.

This stronger version does not only
require that the order of the choice probabilities for A and B be independent, but also
that the ratios of the choice probabilities be
independent of the option sets.

Psychologists have commonly focused
upon testing the weaker and more general
version of the IIA principles, which of course

implies violations of the stronger independence principle. Violations of the weak version

are more remarkable since they represent
changes in the order of preferences, whereas

violations of the strong version may be
caused by only slight changes in the strength

if, and only if, the other is satisfied. Tversky

of preferences. Therefore the focus of our
review is on the weak version. Many studies
show that people violate the weaker form of
the independence principle. Busemeyer and
James T. Townsend (1993) reviewed this lit-

(1972a) also proved that the IIA is sufficient
for guaranteeing the construction of a fixed

driven by the same comparability effects that

utility theory.

erature and argued that these violations were
lead to violations of strong stochastic transi-

There is a stronger version of the IIA

tivity. For example, Busemeyer (1985) inves-

According to Luce (1959), this principle

sequential choices between a gamble and a
"sure thing." Participants, who were paid
according to the gambles' outcomes, had to
choose between gambles: There was a lowrisk gamble, A, (normally distributed with
mean zero and standard deviation 5() and a

principle economists often refer to:

states that when having an option set T containing the options A and B the following
property must hold:
5 Also called "property alpha" by Sen (1993); for an

overview of the different notions, see lain McLean (1995).

tigated the independence axiom in

high-risk gamble, B, (normally distributed
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with mean zero and standard deviation 500).

This preference pattern violates fixed utility

There were also two sure things: C was-10
and D was 10. Participants preferred A to C,

theories for the following reason: The initial

and B to C. Furthermore, p(AI{A,C}) was

Debussy implies that F[u(B), u(D)] > .50 and,

greater than p(BI{B,C}) (i.e., p(AI{A,C}) = .75,
and p(Bi{B,C}) = .56). According to the inde-

pendence principle, p(AI{A,D}) should be

binary choice between Beethoven and

thus, u(B) >u(D). The advantage of

Beethoven over Debussy should continue in
the presence of a second Beethoven record-

greater than p(BI{B,D}). However, the oppo-

ing. That is, with three options,

site order appeared (i.e., p(AI{A,D}) =.30,
and p(BI{B,D}) = .50).
Busemeyer and Townsend (1993) argued

p(BI{B,D,B'}) = F[u(B),u(D),u(B')] > F[u(D),
u(B),u(B')] =p(DI{B,D,B'}) because F is an
increasing function of the first argument and

that choice probability between two gam-

a decreasing function of the remaining

bles, A and B, is an increasing function of the

ratio d = (u(A) - u(B))/o-, where the numer-

arguments. But that is not what happens.
Tversky (1972b) called this violation of the

ator is the expectation of the differences

independence principle the similarity effect.

between the random utilities of the gambles,
and the denominator is the standard deviation of the differences between the random

referred to and adapted to many applications

Debreu's example has been frequently
in economics. For instance, the "red-bus

utilities of the gambles. The standard devia- blue-bus problem" represents a famous
tion, oa, determines how easy or difficult it is adaptation to research on transportation and
to discriminate the mean difference. Choices
travel behavior (e.g., Train 2003). Here a

between the low-risk gamble and the sure traveler has the choice between a car and a
thing are easy to discriminate because the blue bus for traveling to work. Now a second

standard deviation, o0, is small; whereas bus, which only differs from the blue bus in
its red color, is added to the option set.

choices between the high-risk gamble and
the sure thing are difficult to discriminate
because the standard deviation, oa, is large.
Violations of the independence principle

have also been found when choice sets con-

When now choosing among the three

options, decisionmakers might split their
preferences for buses between the red bus

and the blue bus, violating the IIA principle.
tain more than two options. A famous examThe most common random utility theory,
ple originally described by Gerard Debreu the multinomial logit model described
(1960) illustrates this case. Envisage a music above, can not account for these violations
lover who makes choices between classic
because it assumes that the errors are statis-

recordings. When presented with a choice
tically independent. The joint distribution of
between a recording of Beethoven's Eighth
utilities for the set of options Y is assumed to
Symphony (option B) and a recording of the
be identically and statistically independent
Debussy quartet (option D), the music enthufor all choice sets. Since these independence
siast has a higher probability of choosing violations
B.
seem intuitively reasonable, the
Then a different recording of Beethoven's
insufficiency of the multinomial logit model
Eighth Symphony by the same orchestra, but
to explain them has initiated an extensive

with a different conductor is added to the

development of new versions of random util-

choice set (option B'). When evaluating all ity theories. These new versions of random
three options, the music enthusiast has the utility theories, predominantly proposed by
economists, allow correlations in the joint
of the Debussy quartet. The probability of distributions of utilities (for an overview, see
choosing a recording of the Eighth Symphony Robert J. Meyer and Barbara E. Kahn 1991;

highest probability of choosing the recording

is now divided between the two recordings of
the Eighth Symphony, and thus is smaller.

McFadden 2001). These theories have been
successfully applied to describe choices in a
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variety of domains, including transportation

alternatives (David A. Hensher 1986;

(7) Uq(Ai)= Lk + Eiq5

McFadden 1974), occupations (Peterwhere

xikq are explanatory variables, Pkq are

Schmidt and Robert P. Strauss 1975), or the weights for each variable that is
automobiles (Steven T. Berry 1994; Berry, assumed to be a random variable following a

James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes 1999). particular form, such as a normal distribuThree important classes of random utility tion with a particular correlation matrix, 1,
models can be distinguished: generalized and eiq are error components independently
extreme value models, multinomial probit orand identically extreme value distributed.
Thurstone models, and mixed logit models On the one hand, the weights are allowed to
(for an overview, see William H. Greene vary across individuals to capture the het2000 or Train 2003).
erogeneity of individuals' preferences; on
The most prominent model of the general- the other hand, the weights are assumed to
ized extreme value models (McFadden 1978) be stable within an individual to permit cor-

is the nested logit model, which assumes that relations between utilities. These correlathe choice set can be partitioned into subsets, tions can capture similarity effects, and

called nests. The error components in equa- thereby violations of IIA.
tion 2 may be correlated within each subset To illustrate how the mixed logit model can

but are uncorrelated across nests. With this

predict similarity effects, consider the follow-

assumption, the IIA principle holds for all ing problem. Suppose two different types of

options within a nest but not for options across cars share the same share of the automobile
nests. These models can explain particular market. The first car, A, is rather expensive,
violations of IIA.
but very luxurious, whereas the second car,

B, is cheap, but offers only the standard
The second class of random utility models,
multinomial Thurstone or probit models, equipment. Mixed logit models can explain
including Richard D. Bock's and Lyle V. the equal share by assuming that the weights
Jones's (1968) Thurstone model, and Jerry A.

given to price and comfort vary across con-

Hausman's and David Wise's (1978) condi- sumers. Half of the consumers might give a

tional probit model, can also explain viola- relatively high weight to the price, whereas
tions of the IIA. For these models, the error the other half gives a relative low weight to
components in equation 2 are assumed to be the price, so that different utilities for the two
drawn from correlated normal distributions.
cars, but similar market shares, result. Now

Dependencies between these distributions suppose a new car, C, enters the market. It is
cheap and similar to car B. Consumers who
capture correlations between the options.
These models are less restrictive than the
place a relatively high weight on price will
nested logit models and allow the predictionfind this car appealing, whereas the other
of "any pattern of substitutions amongconsumers who preferred car A will not be
attracted to the new car. Therefore, the maroptions" (Meyer and Kahn 1991, p. 98).
The third and most recent class of random ket share of the cheap car B will decrease due

utility models is the mixed logit models, also to the market entry of the second cheap car
called random coefficient models (BerryC, whereas the market share of the expensive

1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995,car A stays stable, which represents a IIA vio1999; Hensher and Greene 2003; David lation. Thus, heterogeneity across individuals
Revelt and Train 1998). Mixed logit modelscan produce correlations among the cars

assume that the weights, /, of the explanato- utilities. Moreover, the distributions from
ry variables k are random parameters thatwhich the weights are drawn can be correlat-

vary across individuals q. According to theseed, so a variety of similarity effects can be
represented.
models, the utility of an option is:
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To explain specific similarity effects, it can

be helpful to represent the mixed logit

model in another form that is mathematical-

ly equivalent to equation 7, but decomposes
the random weights fiqk as follows:

(8) Uq(Ai) = kk Xikq+ +Xkkq" Z'ikq +,iq'

for making predictions about choices if new

options are added to the option set (see
Meyer and Kahn 1991). In general, the
recent random utility theories have been
criticized as being "black box" models that
do not specify the psychological process of

choice (Eliahu Stern and Harry W.

where ak are fixed weights, ykq are random

Richardson 2005).

weights with a mean of zero, and Xikq and Zikq

are explanatory variables. Since the variables

Psychologists have addressed similarity
effects, such as the violations of the IIA, by

Zikq are multiplied by weights with a mean of

developing descriptive theories. Tversky

zero, the sum of the explanatory variables

(1972b) proposed a probabilistic choice

with the random weights, Ykq, and the error
components, Eiq, represent the error compo-

theory called elimination by aspects (EBA).
The theory makes the crucial assumption of

nent of the utility of option i. Notice that,

unlike the error components, e,, the ran-

dom weights, y'kq, can vary across individuals

but not across options. Depending on the
values of Zikq, options' utilities can be corre-

lated. For instance, if an explanatory variable, Zikq, is a dummy variable that reflects

attention switching, which means that
the decisionmakers' attention randomly
switches between the attributes of the

available options (i.e., their aspects). For
instance, in the "red-bus blue-bus-problem" the decisionmaker might consider

convenience and environment friendliness

membership in a nest, the mixed logit model

as two relevant attributes, with the car as

can approximate the predictions of nested

having the aspect of being convenient and

logit models. McFadden and Train (2000)

have shown that, under quite general

assumptions, any random utility model can
be approximated by a mixed logit model.

The mixed logit models and the other
newer versions of the random utility models

the busses as having the aspect of being
environment friendly. When the decision-

maker's attention first focuses on the con-

venience, the two buses are eliminated
from further consideration and the car is

chosen. When, however, first giving consid-

are relatively complex when compared to

eration to the environment friendliness

the multinomial logit model, so that computational problems limited their popularity.
But now, since it is easier to do parameter

wards one of the two buses is chosen. In

estimations, these models are making a
comeback. However, the lack of parsimony
makes it difficult to interpret the parameters, and the models are rather ad hoc (e.g.,
membership in different nests for the nested

logit models), and therefore, do not shed
much light on why the similarity effects
occur. If subsets of options for different
choices can not be defined a priori, one

leads to the car being eliminated, after-

this process the blue bus splits its share
with the red bus, so that the chances of
selecting one of the two buses are smaller
than the chance of choosing the car.
More generally, let T be a three-alternative set, T = {A,B,C}. Each option has aspects

associated with it, some shared and some
unique. Figure 2 illustrates a special case.

Let K be the sum of the utilities of all of the

aspects, unique aspects u(a), u(b) and u(c),
and shared aspects u(ab), u(ac) and u(bc).

should not generalize the predictions of the
model to new choices. Likewise, when fit-

The probability of selecting A from the set,

ting a mixed logit model to data, one can

T, is:

describe different types of similarity effects,
but it is often difficult to predict the effects

(9) p(AIT) = [u(a) +u(ab) . p(AI{A,B}) +

a priori. Thus, these models are less suitable

u(ac) . p(AI{A,C})]/K.
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Figure 2. An Alternative Set Where Alternatives Share Aspects

Equation 9 shows the three ways that A

could be chosen. First, a could be selected

from the set of aspects with probability

that the weights are fixed for each individual
but vary across individuals.

The compromise effect (Itamar Simonson

u(a)/K. If so, A would be chosen with probability 1. Second, ab could be selected with

more recently observed violation of inde-

probability u(ab)/K, and then A would be

pendence with multiple alternatives. Let T be

chosen over B with probability

a three-option set, T = {B,C,D} each of which
is described by two attributes. Option B has

p(AI{A,B}) = (u(a) +u(ac))/(u(a) +u(ac) +
u(b) + u(bc)).
Finally, ac could be selected with probability u(ac)/K, and A would be chosen over C
with probability

p(A I{A,C}) = (u(a) +u(ab))/(u(a) +u(ab) +
u(c) + u(bc)).

1989; Tversky and Simonson 1993) is another,

the most advantageous attribute value for one

attribute, whereas option D has the most
advantageous attribute value for the other
attribute. Option C has attribute values that
lie between the attribute values of option B
and D along both attributes. When presented
with only two options, B and C, option B is

The attention switching assumption of the

more popular so that p(BI{B,C}) 0

elimination by aspects theory resembles the

p(C|{B,C}); however when presented with all
three options, the relation between B and C

mechanism the mixed logit model is using to

explain IIA violations since both theories

reverses so that p(CI{B,C,D}) > p(BI{B,C,D}),

assume that the weights of attributes are not
fixed. The distinction is that the elimination

thus violating IIA.
Simonson demonstrated the effect in a

by aspect theory assumes that weights vary study in which participants made choices

due to attention fluctuations of each individ-

ual, whereas the mixed logit model assumes

among cameras. One camera was high in quality and price, and the other was low in quality
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and price. The third option, called the com-

promise, had moderate values on both

dimensions. When individuals were presented with binary choices, participants were
roughly indifferent between the two options.

However, when given a choice among all

three cameras, individuals chose the com-

promise camera more often than either of
the two extremes. This finding violates the
independence principle.

To explain the compromise effect,

Tversky and Simonson (1993) developed
the componential context theory, which
requires a dimensional representation of the
options in a multidimensional space. In this
theory, Tversky and Simonson distinguished
between the background context defined by

prior choice sets and the local context

so that vk(A) -vk(B) is negative, then
disk(A,B) = 8[vk(B) -vk(A)], or otherwise

zero. The theory makes the crucial assump-

tion that 3 is a convex function incorporating
loss aversion. Due to the loss aversion

assumption, the disadvantage of A over B is
larger than the corresponding advantage of
B over A. In the compromise example, the
compromise alternative C has small advantages and disadvantages relative to B and D,
whereas both B and D have relatively large
advantages and disadvantages with respect

to each other. Due to the convex loss aver-

sion function, the large disadvantages of B
and D make them less appealing, whereas
due to C's small disadvantages, it becomes

the most attractive alternative.

Interestingly, the elimination by aspects
theory (Tversky 1972b) fails to predict com-

defined by the immediate choice set. If the
background context is held constant, then
an option, A, is selected from a set, T, if it

promise effects (see Appendix A for a proof),

maximizes:

explain similarity effects (see Appendix B for

(10) V(AIT) =
IkPkvk(A) + 01BTR(AB)

and the componential context theory fails to

a proof). Neither theory provides a general
and coherent account of independence violations. Nevertheless, the theories demon-

strate that fixed utility theories in which
where the overall value of choosing
A from
options
are evaluated independently of other
set, T, depends on the global context options
and the
are not suitable for explaining the
immediate context. The first term on the
competitive effects of options we reviewed.
right side of the equation reflects the global Eldar B. Shafir, Daniel N. Osherson, and
context and is the sum of the products of
Edward E. Smith (1993) have argued that, to
each value vk associated with A along eachexplain these competitive effects, a comparadimension k times the relative contributions

of that dimension. The second term that

tive approach of decision theories is

required. Theories following this compara-

reflects the immediate context is 6, the relative approach, like the elimination by aspects
tive contribution of the immediate context

theory or the componential context theory,
times the sum of the advantages and disad- incorporate comparison processes among

vantages of A relative to other options in the options in the evaluation process. Shafir,

choice set. The relative advantage of A over Osherson, and Smith (1993) proposed an

B on dimension k is defined as:

(11) R(A,B) =

Xkadvk(A,B)
for which advk(A,B) = vk(A) - Vk(B) if vk(A) -

vk(B) is positive or otherwise zero. If option
A has a disadvantage over B on dimension k

advantage model, which also takes into
account comparisons among options.

However, since the theory is restricted to
pairwise choices and is defined as a deterministic theory, it cannot handle the competitive effects of option sets with more than two

options or the probabilistic nature of choice.
In sum, two more bounds of rationality

have now been crossed. There are numerous
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studies and robust examples of how and

to the attribute levels of the new option that

when people violate strong stochastic transi-

is added to the set.

tivity and the closely related principle of IIA.

Suppose people are indifferent between
two options, A and B. The "decoy" option, D,

These consistency principles must be relaxed

to account for human choice behavior.

is then added to the choice set. D is said to

be "asymmetrically dominated" if it has val-

ues that are worse than those of another

5. Regularity
Random utility theories obey a property of

choice known as regularity. This principle
asserts that the addition of an option to a
choice set should never increase the probability of selecting an option from the original

set. More formally, assume that X is a com-

plete set of options and Y is a subset of

X(YCX), that is Y= {A,...A,,} and

option, such as B, along one attribute and its
values are no better than those of B on all

other attributes. Asymmetric dominance
effects occur if the probability of choosing B
increases when D is added to the choice set.
Attraction effects are similar to asymmetric

dominance effects, but D is not asymmetri-

cally dominated by B. Instead, D simply

seems a lot worse.

These effects are illustrated with the

X = {A,...,A,} with n 0 m. If Y is presented
options in table 2. Suppose a decisionmaker
for choice, and A, is a member of both Y and

is indifferent between two laptop computers,
X, then the probability of choosing Ai from
A
the set Y is always equal to or greater than and B. A is relatively heavy, but has a large
display. B is lighter, with a smaller display.
the probability of selecting A, from the set X,
Now the decisionmaker considers a third
that is, p(Ai IY) - p(A IX). This property holds
computer, D that is heavier than B, but has
for random utility theories since it is less like-

the same sized display. The mere presence of
ly that Ai has the highest utility in a larger set,
D makes B seem better. The probability of
X, with n options than in a smaller set, Y, with
selecting B from the set of three computers
m options:
(A, B, and D) is greater than the probability
p(AiIY) = p(U(Ai) = max{U(Al),...,U(Am)}) of selecting B from the set of two computers
> p(U(Ai) = max{U(A1),...,U(A,,)}) x (A and B). This increase in probability is the
p(U(Ai) = max{U(A),...,U(A)}U(Ai) = asymmetric dominance effect. Now suppose
max{ U(A1),..., U(Am,,) = p(A,IX).

that the decoy, D, is not asymmetrically

dominated by B, yet it still seems inferior to

B (e.g., the display for D is 13.2 inches,
That random utility theories obey the regurather than 13 inches). Here, the increase in
larity principle also holds for newer versions
the probability of B with the inclusion of D is
of random utility theories, including the
the attraction effect. In both cases, the
mixed logit model (see Appendix C forcalled
a

proof).
Do people obey the principle of regularity? Many studies show robust violations of
this principle. The addition of a new option
can increase the choice probability for an
option in the original set. Such violations are

called either asymmetrical dominance

effects (Joel Huber, Payne, and Christopher

result is a violation of regularity.

Asymmetrical dominance effects have

been found in choices among gambles
(Douglas H. Wedell 1991), consumer products and services (Wedell and Jonathan C.

Pettibone 1996), job applicants (Scott

Highhouse 1996), and political candidates in
U.S. elections (Yigang Pan, Sue O'Curry, and

Puto 1982) or attraction effects (Huber and Robert Pitts 1995). The effects occur with
Puto 1983; for an overview, see Timothy B. choices and other measures of preference

Heath and Subimal Chatterjee 1995). The (Dan Ariely and Thomas S. Wallsten 1995;

difference between these two effects refers

Sanjay Mishra, U.N. Umesh, and Donald E.
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TABLE 2

ILLUSTRATION OF ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE EFFECTS WITH CHOICES AMONG LAPTOPS
A

B

D

Weight 6 lbs 3 lbs 3.5 lbs
Display Size 15 ins 13 ins 13 ins

Stem 1993; Pan and Donald R.
TheLehmann
theory postulates that the decisionforms
preference states for options
1993; Tversky and Simonson maker
1993).
Finally,
that
are the
result of previous preference
the effects are highly robust in
both
withinstates plus the
retrieved utilities
subject designs (repeated choices
bycurrently
the

for options minus negative influences of
same individuals) and between-subject

alternative
options
in the choice set. If a
designs (different choices across
groups
of
individuals).
preference state for an option crosses a
Random utility theories cannot account
for violations of regularity because the joint
distribution of utilities for the option set, Y,

threshold, the decisionmaker selects that

option. During the dynamic process of comparing the alternatives, attention switches

is assumed to remain the same when options
are added to create a larger set, X. However,

from one attribute to another; thus, the the-

the empirical evidence suggests that the

assumption as was proposed by the elimina-

joint distribution of utilities for the larger set

tion by aspect theory (Tversky 1972b), which

changes depending on the options that are
included in the set. A psychological theory
that specifies the cognitive process of choice

allows the explanation of similarity effects.
In addition, the theory assumes that options
compete with each other (in the case where

ory also includes an attention switching

and can explain dependencies among

ci > 0) and similar options compete more

options has been proposed by Busemeyer
and Townsend (1993) and Robert M. Roe,

heavily than dissimilar options by exerting
stronger negative influences. These compet-

Busemeyer, and Townsend (2001). It is
called decision field theory. According to this

theory, choices are the result of a dynamic

process during which the decisionmaker
retrieves, compares, and integrates random
utilities over time. During the deliberation
period, a random utility is retrieved for each
option, Ai, at each moment in time t, denot-

ed Ut(Ai). These utilities are integrated
across time by a linear dynamic process to
form a preference state:

(14) Pt(A) = s. Pt_(A) + Ut(Ai) -

itive effects can predict violations of regular-

ity (see Roe, Busemeyer, and Townsend

2001; Busemeyer and Adele Diederich

2002). The theory also predicts that these
violations of regularity should increase when
decisionmakers deliberate longer, a predic-

tion that has been supported in several

experiments (Simonson 1989; Wedell 1991;
Ravi Dhar, Stephen M. Nowlis, and Steven
J. Sherman 2000).

Another psychological theory that can
explain dependencies between options is a

nonlinear adaptive network model called the
leaky, competing accumulator model (Marius
where s is a weight that reflects the memory Usher and James L. McClelland 2004). This

_IJ(Aj),#j

of recent preferences. The coefficients, theory is very similar to decision field theory

ci= cji, are a function of the distancesin the sense that it also assumes that prefer-

between the options in a multidimensional ences develop in a dynamic manner over
time. Likewise, it includes the attention
attribute space.
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TABLE 3

GAMBLES USED BY TVERSKY (1969) To DEMONSTRATE INTRANSITIVE PREFERENCES
A

B

C

D

E

Probability of Winning 7/24 8/24 9/24 10/24 11/24
Payoff $5.00 $4.75 $4.50 $4.25 $4.00

switching assumption to explain similarity

weak stochastic transitivity (see Appendix E

effects. In contrast to decision field theory, it

for a proof).

assumes loss aversion to explain regularity
violations. Thus, it combines the attention

It is interesting to look closely at a classic
study by Tversky (1969) to understand the

switching assumption of the elimination by
aspect theory (Tversky 1972b) with the loss

aversion assumption of the componential
context theory (Tversky and Simonson 1993)
to explain IIA and regularity violations.

6. Weak Stochastic Transitivity
Weak stochastic transitivity is perhaps the
weakest bound on rationality of the five prin-

ciples that we consider. This principle states
that for any arbitrary triple of options, A, B,
and C:

If p(AI{A,B}) > .50 and p(BI{B,C}) 0 .50,
then p(AI{A,C}) 0 .50.

conditions under which violations of weak

stochastic transitivity can occur. Tversky
asked participants to choose between pairs of
gambles, as shown in table 3. Gambles varied
in probabilities and payoffs, but expected
values were similar. When presented with
gambles having similar probabilities, some
participants frequently preferred the gamble
with the larger payoff. That is, they preferred

A to B, B to C, C to D, and D to E. But when

presented with gambles that substantially
differed in probabilities, they preferred the
gamble with the greater probability of winning. That is, they preferred E to A. Tversky's

results were later replicated by Harold R.

Lindman and James Lyons (1978) and
of weak probabilistic choice theories. extended by Jonathan W Leland (1994).

Weak stochastic transitivity lies at the heart

Tversky (1969) proposed an additive dif
Those theories based on standard utility
assumptions must satisfy the principle ference model based on the concept of a just

because u(A) 0 u(B) 0 u(C) -4 p(A|{A,C}) noticeable difference (Luce 1956, p. 180) to
> .50. Furthermore, many strong probabilistic choice theories must also satisfy weak
stochastic transitivity, including all simple
scalable or fixed utility theories, elimination
by aspects theory, and decision field theory.
The contrast-weighting model and the sto-

account for the violations. A just noticeable
difference is the amount of change required
in a physical stimulus before people detect a

difference between similar stimuli on some

percentage of occasions. Tversky argued that
differences in probabilities for the adjacent
chastic-difference model can, however, gambles (i.e., A and B, or B and C) were less
account for violations of weak stochastic
than a just noticeable difference, or not suffitransitivity. Among the random utility mod-ciently great for people to differentiate
between gambles. The additive difference
els considered here, only the mixed logit
model allows violations of weak stochastic
model is a noncompensatory, lexicographic
transitivity (for an example, see Appendixsemi-order A model is noncompensatory if
D). In contrast, the other random utilitythe information from one dimension cannot

models, like, for instance, the generalized be compensated by any combination of inforextreme value model, obey the principle ofmation from other less important dimensions
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(see also Rieskamp and Ulrich Hoffrage

especially when dimensions differ in meas-

the gamble with the highest value on the

intradimensional comparisons simplify the
detection of dominance relationships.

1999). In this account, decisionmakers select
most important dimension, but if the differ-

ence between gambles on that dimension is
too small to be detected, decisionmakers

urement units (Tversky 1969). Finally,
Another class of theories that allow intran-

sitive choices is regret theories (David E. Bell
consider the next most important dimension 1982; Peter C. Fishburn 1982; Loomes and
and choose the gamble with the highest value
Sugden 1982). These theories assume that
on that dimension, and so on.
the decisionmaker prefers the option with
Ariel Rubinstein (1988) and Leland (1994) the highest utility but the utility of an option
offer a similar account to describe choices
depends on an independent evaluation of the
between gambles. They argue that people
option and a comparative evaluation with the
follow a sequential decision process in which
other option as follows:
they first check whether one gamble domi(15) u(Ai) = Ep, [u(x) +

nates the other. Then they compare the

w .- R(u(xs),U(Xsj)),
probabilities across gambles and outcomes
across gambles. If levels of either attribute
where Ai is the option under consideration,
are perceived as being similar on one dimenAj is the alternative option, s refers to states
sion and dissimilar on the other dimension,
with consequences x, and where w = 1 if

the dissimilar dimension becomes decisive.

u(xsi) > u(xsj), and w -=-1 otherwise. The
Only after these steps are completed nonlinear
do
function R(u(xsi), u(xj)) is increas-

decisionmakers move to an unspecified third
ing in its first argument and decreasing in its
step of selecting a gamble. This account, also
second argument; a possible function could
based on perceived similarity, predicts the
be R[u(xs), u(xsj)] = [u(xs) --U(Xsj)].

intransitive choices described above. The

To illustrate, consider three pairwise

contrast-weighting model offered by Mellers
choices between the gambles A, B, and C,

and Biagini (1994) is a more precise version
with outcomes determined by throwing a
of this idea in which the effects of similarity
die. Gamble A has the smallest payoff of $2
and dissimilarity are reflected in the weights
with certainty, gamble B has a medium pay-

associated with the contrasts.

off of $3 if the die throw results in a one,
The idea of a noncompensatory decision two, three, or four, and option C has the
process that focuses on one dimension at a highest payoff of $5 if the die throw results
time combined with a just noticeable differ-in a five or six. In a choice between A and B,
ence is a reasonable explanation for such vio-A has the higher utility because the anticilations, especially when options differ along pated regret associated with B if the die
many dimensions and the differences varycomes up five or six is disproportionately
substantially. It is efficient to place greaterlarge relative to the regret associated with A
attention on dimensions with larger differ- if a one, two, three, or four were thrown.
ences and ignore or discount dimensions with Furthermore, the decisionmaker will prefer

smaller differences (Mellers and BiaginiB to C using the same logic. However, in a

1994). Furthermore, theories that permit vio- choice between A and C, the decisionmaker
lations of weak stochastic transitivity (Tversky will prefer C, because the anticipated regret

1969; Mellers and Biagini 1994; Gonzalez-with A if a one or two is thrown is extremely
Vallejo 2002) assume that decisionmakershigh. As this examples shows, regret theories
compare options intradimensional-wise, that can explain intransitive choices, but they
is, focusing on each dimension sequentially. cannot explain compromise or attraction
Intradimensional comparisons are usuallyeffects, nor can they handle the probabilistic
easier than interdimensional comparisons,

nature of choice.
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How common are violations of weak sto-

choice behavior in many, perhaps even most,

situations.
chastic transitivity? John M. Davis (1958)
found some violations but decided they were

nonsystematic. Donald Davidson and

Marschak (1959) studied preferences for

7. Discussion

bets and found that 7 percent to 14 percentThe goal of the present review is to examof choice triples violated transitivity.
ine how, when, and why people violate conKenneth R. MacCrimmon (1968) examinedsistency principles that embody the

the choices of thirty-eight business mantraditional view of rationality. Five conagers and found that eight exhibited some
straints on preferential choice were
intransitivities, although the violations did
addressed. Those constraints, or consistency
not appear to be reliable. William T.
principles, are partially ordered on a contin-

Harbaugh, Kate Krause, and Timothy R.
uum from strictest to weakest. Figure 1
Berry (2001) examined transitivity in chilshows that the principles include perfect

dren and found relatively few violations,consistency, strong stochastic transitivity,
although many inconsistencies. The intransiIIA, regularity, and, finally, weak stochastic
tivities found by Tversky (1969) were based
transitivity. The evidence for and against
on a preselected group of participants for
each principle was examined. The empirical
whom inconsistent behavior had been
effects, their connections to principles, and
observed before. In a recent summary brief
of the
definitions of the effects are presented
literature, Luce (2000) pointed out
that4. The frequency and breadth of the
in table
declined as we proceeded from
intransitivities may occur, but it may violations
be due
to the simple fact that choices are not stricter
always to weaker bounds. There was strong
consistent (see also Jean Claude Falmagne
evidence against perfect consistency, strong
and Geoffrey Iverson 1979).
stochastic transitivity, independence, and
Other researchers have found systematic
regularity. This evidence is important
violations of weak stochastic transitivity
because it implies that descriptive theories
must relax
(Henry Montgomery 1977; Robert
H.

these constraints in order to make

Ranyard 1977; David V. Budescu and accurate
Wendy predictions.
Weiss 1987; Birnbaum, Jamie N. Patton, and
7.1 Comparison of Models

Melissa K. Lott 1999; Lindman and Lyons
Deterministic theories of choice, such as
1978; Peter Roelofsma and Daniel Read
2000). However, these violations-in stark the subjective expected utility theory
contrast to violations of strong stochastic

(Leonard J. Savage 1954) or multiattribute

transitivity-are relatively rare. That is,

utility theory (Keeney and Raiffa 1976), cannot accommodate the fact that choices are

there are reliable circumstances where they

occur, but those circumstances are fairly probabilistic. The "conventional strategy"

unusual (see Becker, Degroot, and

(Starmer 2000) for handling this problem is

Sjoberg and Capozza 1975; Mellers, Chang,

explain how and when choice probabilities

Marschak 1963; Krantz 1967; Rumelhart to claim that inconsistencies are random.
and Greeno 1971; Sjoberg 1975, 1977; Though tempting, this strategy fails to
Birnbaum, and Ordonez 1992). For these will vary across sets. To accomplish the lat-

reasons, it can be argued that the principle ter, two classes of probabilistic choice theoof weak stochastic transitivity should gener-

ally be retained as a bound of rationality.
Descriptive theories that do not allow violations of weak stochastic transitivity usually
perform reasonably well when predicting

ries were proposed: fixed utility theories
(e.g., Debreu 1958; Luce 1958) and random

utility theories (e.g., Thurstone 1959;
Becker, Degroot, and Marschak 1963;
McFadden 2000).
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TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF EFFECTS

Principles Emperical Evidence Brief Description of Effects
Strong Stochastic Comparability Effects p(AI{A,B)) > .5, p(BI{B,C}) > .5, and p(AI{A,C}) > .5,

Transitivity but p(BI{B,C}) > p(Aj{A,C}) when B and C have similar values on one dimension
Independence Similarity Effects p(BII{Bj,D}) > p(D {B1,D}),

from Irrelevant but p(BI|{Bj,D,B2}) <p(DI{BI,D,B21)

Alternatives

Compromise Effects p(BI{B,C}) > p(CI{B,C}) but p(CI{A,B,C}) > p(B|{A,B,C}) when values of C
are between values of A and B on all dimensions

Regularity Asymmetric Dominance p(AI{A,B,DI) > p(A {A,B}) when D is dominated by A, but not by B
Effects

Attraction Effects p(AI{A,B,D)) > p(AI{A,B}) when D is much inferior to A, but not to B

Weak Stochastic Transitivity Violations p(AI{A,B}) > .5, p(Bj{B,C}) > .5, but p(CI(A,C)) > .5
Transitivity

Fixed utility theories that assume a well- explained by the contrast-weighting model
defined preference function imply strong (Mellers and Biagini 1994) and the stochastic
stochastic transitivity and the IIA. Again, difference model (Gonzalez-Vallejo 2002).
there is a considerable body of empirical evi-

But since these models have only been

dence, including similarity effects, compara- defined for binary choices, they cannot predict

bility effects, and the compromise effect, asymmetric dominance effects, attraction
showing violations of these principles. effects, compromise effects, or similarity
Random utility theories imply a consistencyeffects. The most general theories considered,
principle of regularity. There is a substantial

decision field theory (Busemeyer and

body of evidence, including attraction Townsend 1993; Roe, Busemeyer, and

effects and asymmetric dominance effects, Townsend 2001) and the leaky, competing
accumulator model (Usher and McClelland

against regularity.

A number of psychological theories have 2004), can explain most effects, except
been proposed to accommodate the viola-violations of weak stochastic transitivity.

tions. Table 5 summarizes many of the theo- In sum, we have reviewed several theories
ries previously mentioned and shows which that can predict, to differing degrees, violaeffects they can and cannot predict. Tversky's tions of the consistency principles. We now
(1972b) elimination by aspects theory pro- face the more general question of how to
vides an elegant account of similarity effects select a descriptive theory of preferential

(violation of independence) but fails to choice. Most theorists agree that two criteria

account for asymmetric dominance effectsare essential for model selection: preand attraction effects (violations of regularity). dictability and parsimony (see Heinz Linhart
Tversky and Simonson (1993) developed theand Walter Zucchini 1986; Pitt, Myung, and
componential context theory to account forZhang 2002). The best theory is one that
compromise effects but their theory cannotaccurately predicts human behavior and is
describe similarity effects. Violations of strong simple. Unfortunately, when fitting a model

and weak stochastic transitivity can be to the data, accuracy and parsimony usually
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TABLE 5

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES, VIOLATIONS, AND THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS

Principles Violations Theoretical Accounts
Consistency Variations in MNL GEV MLM DFT LCA CWM SDM EBA
Choices

Strong Comparability GEV MLM DFT LCA CWM SDM EBA ADM

Stochastic Effects
Transitivity

Independence Similarity Effects GEV MLM DFT LCA EBA

from Irrelevant

Alternatives Compromise GEV MLM DFT LCA CCT
Effects

Regularity Asymmetric DFT LCA CCT
Dominance

Effects

Attraction

Effects

DFT

LCA

CCT

Weak Transitivity MLM CWM SDM ADM

Stochastic Violations
Transitivity

where MNL= Multinomial Logit Model, GEV = Generalized Extreme Value Model, MLM = Mixed Logit
Decision Field Theory, LCA = Leaky, Competing Accumulator Model, CWM = Contrast-Weighting Model,
Difference Model, EBA = Elimination by Aspects, CCT = Componential Context Theory, and ADM = Addit
Model

different
parameters, whereas decision fi
work in opposition; the more complex
the
model, the better the fit.
theory can explain these results using th

same
For choice contexts with equally similar
or set of parameters. In this instan

decision
equally discriminable options, violations
of field theory provides a simpler a
more parsimonious explanation. Moreove
IIA are less common and simple scalable
models should suffice. However, this
case is
unlike
decision field theory and the leak
fairly unusual and fails to hold in most
concompeting
accumulator model, mixed log
models
sumer choice tasks (e.g., whenever there
are are unable to explain violations
correlated attribute values or unequal
thevariregularity principle. There are ma

consumer
choice situations that contain defiances in payoffs). If options do vary in
simioptions (e.g., a product that is extrem
larity or discriminability but all cient
of the

ly overpriced
because of its brand name
obviously deficient options have
been
and violations of regularity would be expect
removed, regularity is likely to be satisfied
ed.situaWhen this occurs, one needs to turn
although IIA could be violated. In this
more
complex models that do not requir
tion, recent random utility models like
the
In sum, only the more comp
mixed logit model can be effective. regularity.
Thus, it
models
can happen that multiple theories can
pre-such as the decision field theory,
dict the same violations. For example,
both
leaky
competing accumulator model, or t
logit model can explain several of t
mixed logit models and decision fieldmixed
theory
are capable of explaining similarity behavior
effects.effects that we have reviewed.
Future work will need to focus on direct
However, the mixed logit model requires
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comparisons of these models to explore how

appropriately the models predict human

behavior.

Another important principle to consider
for model selection is generalizability. The
goal of model selection is to find a theory
that is capable of predicting not only the
observed choices in an experiment but also
other behaviors that are independent of the
particular experiment used for parameter
estimation. When predicting new data, sim-

pler models are often more robust and
achieve higher levels of accuracy under new
conditions. This may be particularly important for the design of new products. Simpler

7.2 When Are Violations of Consistency
Principles Reasonable?

We have argued that some violations of
consistency principles are common. Now we
address the question of whether these violations are reasonable. Rationality is traditionally defined as compliance with consistency
principles, and inconsistency implies "irra-

tionality" (Shafir and Robin A. LeBoeuf
2002). This approach has been widely challenged (e.g., Aumann 1962; Machina 1982;
Cohen and Jaffray 1988; Gigerenzer 1991,

1996a, 1996b; Lopes and Oden 1991;
Hammond 1996; Lopes 1996; McFadden

models, built on psychological principles

1999; Mongin 2000). Selten (2001, p. 15)

rather than ad hoc parameters, promise to
be more effective for purposes of generaliza-

argued that "behavior should not be called
irrational simply because it fails to conform

tion. For example, Tversky's (1972b) elimi-

to norms of full rationality" and that "bound-

mechanisms to make a priori predictions

ed rationality is not irrationality." Bounded
rationality is a more accurate description of

nation by aspects model provides

about the effects of new options.

Is there a proper balance between predictability and complexity? The answer
depends on the application and the circumstances. Descriptive theories should be able
to predict violations of consistency princi-

ples when violations are commonplace. A

human behavior taking into account that
people make decisions with limited time,
knowledge, and computational power. This
view, initially proposed by Simon (1956,
1983), recognizes that the lack of compliance with consistency principles could, in

review of the literature suggests that violations are frequent for all of the principles
that we examined, except perhaps weak sto-

fact, be functional. For example, the benefit
of a quick decision could easily outweigh the
cost of some inconsistency.
How reasonable are violations of the five

chastic transitivity. These violations are
quite systematic, but relatively rare (cf.

will begin with perfect consistency, a princi-

Mellers and Biagini 1994). In fact, William

H. Morrison (1963) noted that the theo-

retical number of intransitive triples in a

complete set of pairwise comparisons is
quite limited: Given n options, the maximum number of intransitive triples is
(n + 1)/(4(n -2)). As n increases, the maximum number of intransitive triples approaches one fourth. This result implies that even if

consistency principles discussed here? We
ple that follows from deterministic choice
theories. If individuals had "true" preferences, they might find themselves at a distinct disadvantage if they deviated from those

preferences, especially in the long run.
However, in dynamic environments, where
individuals are continually faced with new
sets of options, some degree of variability is
beneficial for exploring the environment. A

competitive environment is another case

a decision process produces a maximum of
intransitive choices, the intransitive triples
will still be relatively atypical. Therefore,

where some degree of variability could be

increasing the complexity of a theory to

are difficult to forecast has an advantage over

account for violations of weak stochastic
transitivity appears less justified.

desirable. The decisionmaker whose choices

a predictable opponent. In fact, in zero-sum

games stochastic decisions, representing
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mixed strategies, are the only existing Nash
equilibrium defining optimal behavior. In
sum, these real-world advantages of variable preferences could easily carry over into
artificial stable laboratory settings.
Numerous studies cast doubt on the idea

"independent" because they change the con

sequences of the original option (i.e., norms of

politeness). However, this is exactly why viola

tions of independence occur: When people
construct their preferences in a choice situation, additional options can change the conse-

that people possess "true" preferences in thequences of other options or the perception of
sense of fixed utility theories. Instead, the evi-these consequences.
dence suggests that people construct or dis- A decision process that constructs or discover their preferences when presented with covers preferences could also explain viola
option sets. The unfolding of these processestions of regularity. The addition of new
depends on the circumstances of the choiceoptions to a choice set (i.e., adding a les
situation (i.e., the time pressure, the stakes,attractive option) systematically influences
and the way in which preferences are elicit-preferences for options in the original set,
ed) and on the options under considerationviolating the regularity principle. These types
(i.e., the context and the frame). The attrib-of contextual effects need not be unreasonutes an individual uses for comparing options able. When evaluating choice sets, such as

might depend on the option set. Their rela-those in table 2, participants in an experiment
tive "importance" could depend on the simi-might infer that a dominated option, such as
larity of attribute values, and thus explainD, was included in the choice set to provide
comparability effects. Focusing the individ-useful information (Paul H. Grice 1975,

ual's attention on attributes with different values seems like an efficient and reasonable

form of decision making.
Violations of IIA could also be reasonable.

1989; see also Denis J. Hilton 1995).

Participants might infer that laptop computers with large displays, such as A, are relatively uncommon and perhaps less desirable than

For instance, Greene (2000, p. 864) in hislaptop computers with smaller displays, such

standard textbook in econometrics writes

as B and D. If the market for larger displays is

small, B could be the best choice.
that the principle "is not a particularly

Birger Wernerfelt (1995) made a similar
appealing restriction to place on consumer
argument by suggesting that people use the
available options to draw inferences about
(1999, p. 110) argue that the substitutions
their own tastes and utilities. Decisionmakers
effects that are implied by the IIA principle
whoand
know their relative but not their
"can be unrealistic in many settings"
McFadden (2001, p. 358) argues thatabsolute
they utilities could make assumptions

behavior." David Brownstone and Train

about the correct choice from the choice set
"may not be behaviorally plausible."
if they
Likewise, Hensher and Greene (2003,
p. believed the options reflected popula-

tion utilities. They would use the market
135) regard the principle as "questionable."
The famous "red-bus blue-bus" example
offerings to assign utilities and infer their
preferences. Drazen Prelec, Wernerfelt,
described above shows that in many own
situaand
Florian
Zettelmeyer (1997) developed a
tions it appears unreasonable to follow the
context model that reflects simple inferIIA principle. Amartya Sen (1993) presented

ences
another illustrative example of a decision
as toabout one's own preferences (ideal
points) given what is available (product
whether to take an apple out of a fruit basket

"addresses"). They generate predictions that
at a dinner party. A person who behaves

canthe
simulate compromise and attraction
decently might not take the apple if it is
last. But, if more than one apple is left effects.
in the Though promising, their model
requires additional information (category
basket, the same person might take an apple.
ratings) that reflect a decisionmaker's ideal
Of course, the additional apples are not really
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violates the axiom may be "taken" by a
money pump (see Davidson, John Charles
In sum, the different violations of consis- C. McKinsey, and Suppes 1955; Robin P.
tency principles can be justifiable within a Cubitt and Sugden 2001). Being "taken"

point and his or her perceptions of product
addresses.

"bounded rationality" framework. Bounded means that a decisionmaker who starts with
rationality stresses how choices depend on an option and cycles through a series of
the characteristics of the environment. It also choices, paying each time for a new option,
stresses how the selection of simple strate- will eventually end up with less money and
gies can be quite adaptive. For example, the original option. It is unquestionable that
Gigerenzer and Daniel G. Goldstein (1996) such intransitive choices are costly and
demonstrated that a simple lexicographic unreasonable. However, we do not
heuristic provided accurate predictions in a encounter money pumps very often and, if
paired-comparison inference task. If a we did, we would probably learn to avoid
them. As experimental results show (Yunheuristic is fairly good, it might be beneficial,
even if it occasionally produces intransitive Peng Chu and Ruey-Ling Chu 1990), build-

choices. Consistent, Rieskamp and Otto

ing a money pump is not easy because

(2006) could show that simple heuristics can people typically recognize their intransitive
predict individuals' choices quite well. choices and quickly change their behavior.
Warren Thorngate (1980) and Payne, Thus, money pump "arguments are logical
Bettman, and Johnson (1988) demonstrated bogeymen" (Lopes 1996, p. 187) that
that simple heuristics can also be efficient demonstrate how irrational behavior in
when choosing among options with a flat principle could occur, but that do not show
maximum. Another heuristic that can lead to
that irrational behavior in fact occurs.
The regular, systematic, and robust violaintransitivities is the majority rule (e.g.,

Kenneth O. May 1954; Maya Bar-Hillel and
Avishai Margalit 1988). With this rule, the
decisionmaker simply counts the number of
dimensions where an option has an advan-

tions of consistency set the requirements for

descriptive theories of choice. The violations

we have discussed are interrelated in subtle

and interesting ways; they illustrate system-

tage (disregarding the magnitude of the atic behavioral principles. Whether they
advantages) and selects the option with the represent rational or irrational behavior
greatest number of advantages. By focusing might be analogous to asking whether the
only on the relative advantage of an option glass is half empty or half full. What really
compared to alternative options, the majority
matters is (1) understanding how and why
rule can violate transitivity. Nonetheless,
people make choices and (2) being able to
these heuristics, such as the lexicographic or predict those choices. Debates about rationmajority rule, require only a small subset of ality focus attention far too narrowly. A
the available information, which is then easy

broader conversation-one that considers

to process. Heuristics can be regarded as reasonable behavior, adaptive behavior, and
"approximation methods" of more complex the environment in which choices occur-is
strategies, and by "using such methods.., we long overdue. We look forward to this shift

implicitly assume that the world is not in focus and the related evidence and theo-

designed to take advantage of our approxi- ries that will unfold in the next several
mation methods," whereas experiments are decades.
often "designed with exactly that goal in
APPENDICES

mind" (Tversky 1969, p. 46).
The traditional argument that transitivity
Appendix A: Proof that the elimination by
is a cornerstone of rationality is based on
aspect theory cannot explain compromise

the observation that a decisionmaker who

effects.
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Consider a choice set consisting of three

effect (see Tversky 1972b). For binary

cameras labeled A, B, and C. A is a high-

choices, EBA predicts:

quality camera with many high-quality fea-

(A2)

p(A|{A,B})=

tures and is very expensive; B is a low-quality

camera with no high-quality features and is
quite cheap; C is between the two extremes,
having some, but not all, of the high-quality
features and is moderately priced. The compromise camera shares some features with
both extreme options. With the compromise

effect, p(AI{A,B}) = p(A|{A,C}) = p(BI{B,C}).
But, when the three options are evaluated

u(a)

The compromise eff
choice probabilities f

choices are equal so th

(A3) u(a) + u(ac) = u(b) + u(bc),

(A4) u(a) + u(ab) = u(c) + u(bc), and

together, p(C|{A,B,C}) > p(A {A,B,C}) and
p(CI{A,B,C}) > p(B|{A,B,C}). The componential context theory (Tversky and

From (Al) and (A5) it is known that

Simonson 1993) predicts the compromise

u(b) > u(c) and from (Al) and (A4) it is

effect. In contrast, the elimination by aspects

known that u(a) > u(c). For triadic choices,

theory (Tversky 1972b) cannot predict the

EBA predicts

effect, as shown below. In the elimination by

aspects theory, alternatives are composed of
common and unique positive aspects:
a = unique aspects of A,
b = unique aspects of B,
c = unique aspects of C,

ab= common aspects between A and B,

(A5) u(b) + u(ab) = u(c) + u(ac).

p(AI{A,B,C}) = [u(a) + u(ab) . p(A|{A,B}) +
u(ac).p(AI{A,C})]/u(K),

where u(K) = [u(a) + u(b) + u(c) + u(ab) +

u(ac) + u(bc)]. The compromise effe
implies

p(CI{A,B,C}) > p(A {A,B,C}) or
[u(c) + .5(u(ac) + u(bc))]/u(K) >

but not with C,

ac= common aspects between A and C,

[u(a) + .5(u(ab) + u(ac))]/u(K),

but not with B, and

p(CI{A,B,C}) > p(BJ{A,B,C}) or

bc= common aspects between B and C,
but not with A.

[u(c) + .5(u(ac) + u(bc))]/u(K) >
[u(b) + .5(u(ab) + u(bc)}]/u(K).

Let u be a scale that assigns a positive
value to these aspects so that, for instance,
u(a) represents the positive value of aspects
a to the decisionmaker. Cameras A and C

If both sides of the inequalities are multi-

plied by 2 and u(K) is cancelled out, the

result is:

share some high-quality features, whereas

cameras A and B have little in common so

(A6) [u(c) + u(bc) + u(c) + u(ac)] >

that u(ac) > u(ab). Cameras B and C share

[u(a) + u(ac) + u(a) + u(ab)],

the positive aspect of not being very expen(A7) [u(c) + u(bc) + u(c) + u(ac)] >
sive, which cameras A and C do not share so
[u(b) + u(bc) + u(b) + u(ab)].
that u(bc) > u(ab). Thus, on the basis of the

similarity relations among the choice
With the substitutions from (A3) and (A4),
options, it can be assumed that:

(Al) u(ac) > u(ab) and u(bc) > u(ab).

inequality (A7) can be rewritten as

[u(a) +u(ab) +u(c) +u(ac)] >
[u(a) + u(ac) + u(b) + u(ab)].

These assumptions, regarding the mapping
After canceling on both sides, it is found
from options to similarity relations, are essential for EBA to account for the similaritythat u(c) > u(b), contradicting the earlier
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conclusion that u(b) > u(c) from (Al) and

(B2)

(A5). Similarly, with the substitutions from
(A4), inequality (A6) can be rewritten as

[u(a) + u(ab) + u(c) + u(ac)] >
[u(a) + u(ac) + u(a) + u(ab)].

V(AI{A,B,D}) =
kPkVk(A) + O[R(A,B) + R(A,D)]

where Y'kfkvk(A) = v(A) represents the value

v of option A neglecting advantages of other
options and:

After canceling on both sides, it is found

(B3)

that u(c) > u(a), contradicting the earlier
conclusion that u(a) > u(c) from (Al) and
(A4). Therefore, EBA cannot predict the

ikadvk(A,B)

compromise effect.

Appendix B: Proof that the componential

context theory cannot explain similarity
effects.

Consider a choice set consisting of three
cameras labeled A, B, and D. A is a high-qual-

ity camera with many high-quality features
and is expensive; B is a low-quality camera
with no extra features and is very cheap.
Camera D is a slightly higher-quality camera
than A; it has more quality features and a
slightly higher price than A. D is very similar

to A, and both A and D are quite different
from B. The similarity effect implies that

p(AI{A,B}) = p(AI{A,D}) = p(BI{B,D}). But,
when the three options are evaluated togeth-

er, either p(BI{A,B,D}) > p(AI{A,B,D}) or
p(BI{A,B,D}) > p(DI{A,B,D}). The proof that
the componential context theory cannot predict the similarity effect can be demonstrated
with the first of the two triadic choices.

The componential context theory is based
on the idea that people consider the advantages of one option over those of another.

Camera A has a higher-quality advantage
over B and camera B has a higher-price
advantage over A. The quality advantage of
A over B is denoted adv(A,B) and the price
advantage of B over A is denoted adv(B, A).
For triadic choice sets, the model assumes:

(BI) p(AI{A,B,D}) = F[V(AI{A,B,D}),
V(BI{A,B,D}), V(D|{A,B,D})]
where F is an increasing function of the first

where advk(A,B) = Vk(A) - Vk(B) if A has a
positive advantage over B, and zero other-

wise, and disk(A,B) = 6[vk(B) -Vk(A)] if
option A has a disadvantage over B, and zero
otherwise, and where 6 is a convex function
consistent with loss aversion so that the

value for the disadvantage of A over B is

larger than the corresponding advantage of
B over A. Convexity is required to explain

the compromise effect (Tversky and

Simonson 1993).

The fact that the binary choices are all

equal implies: adv(B,D)-=adv(D,B) and

v(B) = v(D); adv(B,A) = adv(A,B) and v(A)
= v(B); adv(D,A) = adv(A,D) and v(A)
= v(D).

For the similarity effect, as described
above, the largest advantage on price occurs
between B and D, the next largest advantage
occurs between B and A, and the smallest

advantage occurs between A and D. That is:

(B4) adv(B,D) > adv(B,A) > adv(A,D).
To explain the similarity effect we must

obtain

(B5) V(BI{A,B,D}) > V(A|{A,B,D1)
and because

adv(B,A)
adv(B,A)

argument and a decreasing function of the
second two. Furthermore:

(B5) is true when
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adv(B,D)

adv(B,D)
adv(A,D)

Assume that Y is a set of options
Y = {A1,...,A,,}, for instance a number of

college applicants following Tversky's

(1969) example. Each candidate i is

described by three attribute values Xik, intel-

lectual stability (k = 1), emotional stability
(k = 2), and social facility (k = 3). Suppose,

the first candidate has the attribute values

x1l this
= 66, x12= 90, and x13= 85, the second
But if adv(B,D) > adv(A,D), as in (B4),
candidate
has the values x21= 78, x22= 70,
equation must be false for convex 3 func-

x,2 = 55, and the third candidate has the
tions. Thus, the componential contextand
model
cannot predict the similarity effect.

values xa31= 90, x32= 32, and xa33= 4. We can

satisfy regularity.

candidate is

apply the mixed logit model as defined by
equation 7, such that the choice probability
Appendix C: Proof that mixed logit models
when choosing between the first and second
Assume that X is a complete set of options

p(A1I

and Y is a subset of X(Y C X), that is
Y= {A1,...,Am} and X= {A1,...,An} with

n m. Define L(Ai Y; /) as the probability

For
convenience, define
that option Ai is chosen from a set Y given
a

Following
the logic of
fixed set of coefficients P3. For example,
L
assume
the
vector of
may be defined by a mixed logit model with
with
equal
probability
random coefficients P (see for example,
McFadden and Train, 2000). AssumeQ=
that :{(11-= -1, 321= 3.2,

L(Ai Y;1) satisfies regularity. In other words,

P22=-3.025,
1P32=2.45),
( A -3=0.2,
Then, the probability
of
given Y C X, it is assumed that L(Ai -0.595,
Y;13)A13=0.51)}.
choosing
the
first
candidate
when
comparing
L(AiJX; ) > 0 for every 13. Then it follows

123=

the first and second candidate is:
that p(AiIY) is given by a probability mixture

of L(AilY;fl) as defined by the integral over
p(A1{A1,A2}) = [v11/(v11 +V21) +

the densityf.

p(AjIY) = JL(Ai Y;P) . f(P)dP.
Then the difference

p(AjiY) - p(AIX) =

JL(AiIY;1) -f(/)d - jL(A IX; P) -f(P)dP=
J[L(Ai IY;1P) - L(AijX;fP)] . f(f)dp > 0

is always positive, which implies that
p(AI|Y) > p(AijX). Therefore the mixed logit
model satisfies regularity.

v12A/(v12+v22) +v13 /(V13 +V23)]/3

= [el/(el+ e3) + e2/(e2 + e') +
e3/(e3 + e2)]/3 = 0.53.
Correspondingly, the probability of choosing

the second candidate when comparing the
second and third candidate can be deter-

mined, so that p(A21 {A2,A3}) = 0.53 results.
Finally, when comparing the first and the

third candidate the probability

p(A11 {A1,A3}) = .47 results, which violates
weak stochastic transitivity.

Appendix E: Proof that the generalized
extreme value model satisfies weak stochastic

Appendix D: Example of how the mixed
logit model can explain violations of weak

transitivity.

stochastic transitivity.

Y = {A1,...,Am}. The generalized extreme

Assume that Y is a set of options
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value model defines the binary choice
probability as follows:

p(AiJ{Ai,Aj})

exp

Birnbaum, Michael H., Jamie N. Patton, and Melissa
K. Lott. 1999. "Evidence Against Rank-Dependent
Utility Theories: Tests of Cumulative Independence,
Interval Independence, Stochastic Dominance, and
Transitivity." Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 77(1): 44-83.

Bock, Richard D., and Lyle V. Jones. 1968. The
Measurement and Prediction of Judgment and
Choice. San Francisco: Holden-Day.

where X is a vector ofBrownstone,
attributes,
P3
is a
vecDavid and Kenneth
E. Train.
1999.
tor of weights assigned
to the
attributes,
and
"Forecasting
New Product
Penetration with Flexible

Substitution Patterns." that
Journal ofdepends
Econometrics,
0 is as free similarity parameter
89(1-2): 109-29.
on the similarity between the pair of options
Budescu, David V., and Wendy Weiss. 1987. "Reflection
for each choice set and that can account for
of Transitive and Intransitive Preferences: A Test of

violations of IIA. Note that

Prospect Theory." Organizational Behavior and

Human Decision Processes, 39(2): 184-202.
p(Ai {Ai,Aj1}) > .50 -- p(Aij {Ai,Aj)/p(AjI {Ai,Aj}) Busemeyer, Jerome R. 1985. "Decision Making Under
Uncertainty: A Comparison of Simple Scalability,
Fixed-Sample, and Sequential-Sampling Models."

=Sexp(f3Xi/O)

Therefore if

p(AiI{A,,Ai1) > .50 and p(AjI{Aj,Ak }) > .50,
then
OXi> OX, and fPXj, > -> fPXk PX, > fPXk > ->

p(AiI{A,,Ak}) > .50.
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